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Abstract: This study provides view of free cash flow and corporate governance (CG) by addressing the 
relationship between audit committee characteristics with free cash flow. Specifically, this study explores 
whether audit committee characteristics are substitutes to control agency problem regarding to free cash 
flow within Malaysian firms. The data set comprise of 200 firm observations Malaysian companies for four 
consecutive years, which comprise of 2005 to 2008. The results show that size of audit committee, frequency 
of audit committee meeting, proportion of audit committee independence is positively associated with level 
of free cash flow (FCF). The results of study highlight the importance of corporate governance mechanism, in 
the form of audit committee characteristics, in the management of cash flow.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of free cash flow has been introduced by Jensen (1986), in which it refers to the amount of  cash 
which is in surplus that can finance projects that have positive net present values. Managers (agents) can 
allocate the free cash in a profitable investments or spend it inefficiently in restructuring plans to increase the 
size of the firm for the purpose of increasing managers’ remuneration (Dorff, 2006). On the other hand, 
manager could also spend the free cash flow as dividend payment to shareholders. Therefore, management 
decision on free cash allocation could reduce or increase the agency problem within a firm.  As stated in 
agency theory, when ownership and control are separated management’s interest can deviate from owners’ 
interests (Jensen, 1986). Therefore controlling and monitoring decisions by the management becomes 
essential for the board of directors  in order to protect the interest of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Board of directors and audit committee are the body primarily responsible for management in corporate 
governance structure of a firm, which include the internal governance of a firm. Subsequently, the committee 
evaluate the effectiveness of managers in the allocation and management of free cash flow. This study focuses 
more on audit committee characteristics, which consists of members of the board that helps in overseeing the 
management of free cash flow and the financial reporting process. The audit committee provide a 
communication bridge between management and the internal and external auditors (Carcello & Neal, 
2000).The BRC (1999) states that an audit committee which has more independent members, who are 
financially literate, hold more frequent meetings and, and larger in size is better capable to evaluate 
management’s decision on accounting issues and reporting activities.  
 
This study, considers audit committee characteristics in order to study if it has any relationship with level of 
free cash flow of a firm. The argument is since corporate governance attributes such as audit committee 
characteristics, which are called internal governance within a firm, alleviate agency problems in a firm 
especially by considering the modern business world. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to 
examine whether there is any relationship between internal governance characteristics and free cash flow. 
This study considers the audit committee as the body primarily responsible for management in corporate 
governance structure of a firm. The study focuses on the analysis of audit committee characteristics and its 
interrelationship with free cash flow. In particular these attributes of corporate governance variables are 
examined to determine how they impact free cash flow using a unique complete dataset of Malaysian listed 
firms. The main contribution of the current study it its being the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to 
examine the relationship between audit committee characteristics and amount of free cash flow. This study 
allows us to establish the significant relationship between these two with focus on internal governance in 
corporate governance. Another contribution discovers that most previous studies about these subjects have 
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been carried out in developed countries. But, this study was done in Malaysia, where the capital market is at 
the infancy stage. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Agency theory defines the relationship between management and stockholders as a contract between agents 
and principals. The agent’s behavior is conditioned by implicit and explicit incentive structures stated in the 
contract.  Agency problem goes up when the managers or agents make decisions in the best interests of 
themselves without considering shareholders’ interests. Jensen (1986) states that agency problems which are 
related to equity are due to the existence of excessive free cash flows at the discretion of manager (agent). 
Jensen (1986) explained free cash flow as: “The extra cash or in surplus of that needed to fund all projects 
that have positive net present values when discounted at the appropriate cost of capital.” So, free cash flow 
follows a particular conflict between managers and shareholders because managers have control over this 
amount. So, when firms have extra cash there is a risk of spending it in projects with no added value than 
having good opportunities for investment. Normally, the managers prefer to spend this money instead of 
allocating the money among shareholders in the form of dividends. Managers are not certain whether the 
growth rate would stay the same for the next year hence they are cautious of distributing the free cash flow as 
dividend among shareholders. On the other hand, Jensen (1986) free cash-flow hypothesis suggest that if 
firms have cash in excess of their requirement of investment in positive net present value projects, it is better 
to pay these cash as dividend in order to reduce managerial discretionary of funds and thus avoid agency 
costs of free cash flow. The literature on cash holding and capital structure normally regards the policies of 
firms to keep more cash if potential cash flows are more unstable and investment opportunities are less 
expected in the future (Opler et al., 1999). Corporate governance characteristics are predicted to influence the 
level of free cash flow.  
 
Audit Committee Size: An effective audit committee can control and monitor the performance of 
management. However its effectiveness can depend on its size (Vinten, 1993) . The dependence theory states 
that there is a positive association between size of an audit committee and financial performance of firm 
(Pierce & Zahra, 1992). Accordingly, the audit committee becomes more effective when the size of the 
committee goes up, due to the fact that when company faces problems, it has more resources (man power) to 
solve these problems. When the size of the committee is big, it is also means there are more skills and 
knowledge sharing which can be utilized to monitor the financial reporting and procedure. BRC (1999) 
suggest that audit committees must consist of at least three members and at least one of its members should 
be financially literate. Research has shown that the audit’s size is a significant aspect in governance structure; 
although the consequences are uncertain on whether having smaller size is better than larger ones (see for 
examples (Dalton et al., 1999; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996). There is mixed results of the effect of 
audit committee’s size towards performance. A small audit committee size may be more efficient due to less 
involvement in technical issues. Therefore, audit committee with smaller size may provide a better oversight 
in financial reporting issue. On the other hand, a larger audit committee may provide a wider range of 
experience and expertise. Other studies indicate a positive but a weak relationship between the size of audit 
committee and a company’s performance (Eichenseher & Shields, 1985; Menon & Deahl Williams, 1994; 
Pincus et al., 1990). The results from prior studies are not clear about the effect of audit size committee on 
firm performance. However, this study predict the efficiency of audit committee increases while the size of 
the audit committee goes up especially in matters that company face problems because it has more options 
for resolving issues. 
H1: There is a relationship between audit committee size and free cash flow. 
 
Audit Committee Independence: An audit committee member who is independent is also considered as 
efficient  (Raghunandan et al., 2001). Independent audit members lead to the improvement in the 
independency between management and external auditors (Abbott et al., 2004) by accurately communicate  
issues within the firm to the management (Raghunandan et al., 2001). Additionally, independent audit 
committee possesses higher business knowledge which leads to less accounting conflicts.  Raghunandan et al. 
(2001) further suggest that independent audit committees assess the internal auditing plans of a firm and its 
achievements and protect the shareholder’s interests  (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Therefore audit 
committee members should be independent of the management.  Accordingly, the independent audit 
533 
 
committee members would ensure better financial management of companies, which also include the 
management of free cash flow. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as follows.  
H2: There is a relationship between audit committee independence and free cash flow. 
 
Frequency of Audit Committee Meeting: An effective audit committee should carry out its tasks diligently 
for the purpose of achieving its goals and purposes (FCCG, 1999)Since diligence is difficult to monitor 
directly, past researchers utilizes audit committee meeting regularity as a substitute for diligence 
(Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). Meeting frequency is measured as the number of audit committee meetings 
held during the year. An effective audit committee should carry out its tasks diligently for the purpose of 
achieving its goals and purposes (FCCG, 1999)Since diligence is difficult to monitor directly, past researchers 
utilizes audit committee meeting regularity as a substitute for diligence (Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). The 
BRC (1999) and the also state that an audit committee inside a firm should have a meeting at least four times 
during a financial year. The committees plan and make decision during these meetings. In addition, making 
decisions on free cash flow could be done during these meetings, which are an important factor of this study 
by regarding if there is any relationship with free cash flow with audit committee meetings. Previous studies 
show that the number of financial reporting issues decrease when an audit committee meets frequently 
during a year.  A more frequent meeting during a year with the outside auditors also means that problem 
related to financial matter and auditing can be resolved more quickly(Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). 
Therefore, it is predicted that an audit committee who meet more frequently, would be able to resolve many 
financial related issues, which also include the decision on the spending free cash flow. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between audit committee meeting and free cash flow. 
 
Financial Expertise: To be an effective and efficient board structure, at least one members of audit 
committees need to be financially literate (Abdul Hamid et al., 1999).  Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance has stated this specific requirement in which a minimum of one member of audit committee must 
be a financial expertise a firm (Rahman & Ali, 2006). DeZoort and Salterio (2001) state that financial 
expertise within an audit committee might increase the probability that discovered objects will be associated 
with the audit committee structure. These kinds of audit committee members are more capable for 
controlling and monitoring internal governance inside a firm and in order to recognize and solve different 
financial and accounting problems which can happen inside a firm (Zhang et al., 2007). In addition, audit 
committees which include financial experts would have more connection with their internal auditors inside a 
firm(Raghunandan et al., 2001) .Audit committee structures who have more financial skills could recognize 
easier auditor opinions and can prevent the auditors in conflicts which happened inside a firm between 
management and shareholders (DeZoort & Salterio, 2001) .So, according to prior studies there is an 
association between financial expertise and management conflicts and it could lead to affecting management 
decision on spending free cash flow. In this research the relationship between free cash flow and financial 
expertise is considered. Therefore, existing audit committee members with financial expertise lead to have 
effective and efficient internal governance. But, making decisions on keeping or spending free cash flow is still 
questionable in firms even when there is powerful internal governance. 
H4: There is an association between audit committee financial expertise and free cash flow. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Sample: The research sample consists of 50 firms (200 observations) for four consecutive years, from 2005 
until 2008. The sample includes non-financial firms, which consider the financial statements especially their 
cash flow statements and income statement and the other data that are related to this research. The sampling 
method, which has been used for this research is simple random sampling. 
 
Data Collection: The data used for this study was hand collected from annual reports retrieved from the 
official website of Bursa Malaysia. Hand collected data has a number of benefits. The foremost benefit is, since 
hand collected data source is primary and official, it is also more accurate and higher in quality than 
secondary data sources (Abbott et al., 2004). This research uses cross-sectional method to collect data.  
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Measurement of variables: We utilize the cross-sectional regression model in order to test if there is any 
association between audit committee characteristics (audit size, audit independence, audit committee 
meetings, audit financial expertise) with free cash flow. The research equation is as follows:  
 
FCFit = α0it + α1ACSIZEit + α2ACINDEPit + α3ACMEETit + α4ACFIN it + α5LOGTA it + α6ROE it + α7LEVERAGEit + 
α8LOGDPSit + ɛit 
Where: 
 
FCF= Free cash flow (profit after tax - changes in capital expenditure + depreciation  & amortization - changes 
in working capital)  
ACSIZE= total of audit members  
ACINDEP= proportion of independent audit members 
ACMEET= number of meeting held by audit committee 
ACFIN= proportion of financial expertise of audit committee members. 
ROE= net profit before interest and tax divided by total equity 
LEVERAGE= total debt divided by total assets 
LOGTA= logarithm of total assets 
DPS= dividends per share 
 
4. Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of sample of the study. The average free cash 
flow of sample of firms is RM37, 558,053 (range from minimum of RM (9,399,564,224) to maximum of RM9, 
352,462,697) for the year of 2005-2008. The mean size of audit committee members (ACSIZE) is about 3 
revealing that the size of the audit committees is considerably low in Malaysia. The mean percentage of audit 
committee independence and audit committee meeting is about 73.5% and 4.755, respectively. Similarly, 
audit committee’s financial expertise percentage is 32.9%. Additionally, the mean for frequency of audit 
committee meeting is about 5 meetings a year with a maximum of 8 and minimum of once.  On the other side, 
the minimum of total assets (TA) as the first control variable in this study is RM 25,000,000 while its 
maximum is RM17, 621,224,000. The next one is ROE, which indicates changes from the minimum of (1.560) 
to 2.899 and the mean of 0.153. LEVERAGE, as shown in this table, shows a minimum value of 0.006 and a 
maximum of 2.450. The last control variable is DPS with a mean of 0.111 for the period of 2005 until 2008 
among selected firms in Malaysia for 2005-2008. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms (2005-2008) 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev. 
FCF 37,558,053 9,352,462,697 (9,399,564,224) 1,296,102,543 
ACSIZE 3 8 3 0.77 
ACINDEP 0.735 1.000 0.250 0.158 
ACMEET 4.755 8.000 1.000 0.964 
ACFIN 0.329 0.750 0.00 0.156 
TA (RM) 1,608,529,181 17,621,224,000 25,000,000 2,704,604,476 
ROE 0.153 2.899 (1.560) 0.460 
LEVERAGE 0.479 2.450 0.006 0.359 
DPS 0.111 2.650 0.000 0.370 
Note: FCF = Free cash flow, ACSIZE = total of audit committee members, ACINDEP = proportion of 
independent audit members, ACMEET = number of meeting held by audit committee, ACFIN = proportion of 
financial expertise of audit committee members, ROE = net profit before interest and tax divided by total 
equity, LEVERAGE = Total debt divided by total assets, TA = Total Assets, LOGDPS = Dividends per share.  
 
Correlations Matrix of Variables: Table 2 presents the correlations between the variables. According to this 
table, all the variables have a significant relationship with free cash flow. It shows that there is a considerable 
association between audit committee meeting and FCF. In addition, based on this table there is a positive 
correlation between all independent variables with free cash flow except audit committee financial expertise. 
Likewise, it is reflected for control variables in this study excluding leverage. Lastly, as none of our 
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independent variables demonstrate any correlation value of above 0.7, further tests are applied to investigate 
the existence of relationship, which is applied in the next part. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Sample Firms (2005 – 2008) 
  LOGFCF ACSIZE ACINDEP ACMEET ACFIN LOGTA ROE LEVERAGE LOGDPS 
 LOGFCF  1.000         
 ACSIZE  0.151 1.000        
 ACINDEP  0.072 (0.176) 1.000       
 ACMEET  0.200 0.003 0.022 1.000      
 ACFIN  (0.071) 0.039 0.085 0.030 1.000     
 LOGTA  0.576 0.050 (0.045) 0.090 0.093 1.000    
 ROE  0.286 (0.064) (0.007) 0.035 0.017 0.052 1.000   
 LEVERAGE  (0.021) (0.020) 0.103 (0.144) (0.115) (0.190) 0.161 1.000  
 LOGDPS  0.332 0.009 (0.060) (0.050) 0.067 0.244 0.632 0.065 1.000 
Note: FCF = Free cash flow, ACSIZE = total of audit committee members, ACINDEP = proportion of 
independent audit members, ACMEET = number of meeting held by audit committee, ACFIN = proportion of 
financial expertise of audit committee members, ROE = net profit before interest and tax divided by total 
equity, LEVERAGE = Total debt divided by total assets, TA = Total Assets, LOGDPS = Dividends per share.  
 
Multivariate Results: Table 3 represents the regression results of the sample for the year of 2005-2008. The 
adjusted R2 is 48.1% for Model 1 and 41.9% for Model 2. Model 1 includes independent and control variables, 
whereas in Model 2 it includes only control variables. The results show that audit committee size (ACSIZE) is 
positively significant at one percent level. It means that when the ACSIZE is higher the FCF is more and vice 
versa. The relationship between audit committee’s size and firm financial presentation is supported by the 
dependence theory (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Therefore H1in this study is accepted.  
 
Table 3: Results of Regression for Sample Firms-FCF (2005-2008), n = 200 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
VARIABLES Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -1.039 -1.172 .662 .811 
ACSIZE .199 2.678***   
ACINDEP .789 2.178**   
ACMEET .178 2.987***   
ACFIN -.113 -1.630   
LOGTA .750 8.596*** .792 8.647*** 
ROE .323 2.017** .312 8.647 
LEVERAGE .130 .831 .168 1.028 
LOGDPS .181 .976 .100 .516 
R2 0.511  0.436  
Adjusted R2 0.481  0.419  
F-statistic 16.874  25.659  
Note: FCF= Free cash flow, ACSIZE= total of audit committee members, ACINDEP= proportion of independent 
audit members, ACMEET= number of meeting held by audit committee, ACFIN=proportion of financial 
expertise of audit committee members, ROE= net profit before interest and tax divided by total equity, 
LEVERAGE= Total debt divided by total assets, LOGTA= Total Assets, LOGDPS=Dividends per share.  
***, **, *Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively  
 
 The results indicate that the audit committee independence variable (ACINDEP) is also positively significant 
at 5 percent level.  It illustrate that when the percentage of independence of audit committee is higher the 
amount of free cash flow also become higher. Therefore H2 is accepted. Prior studied stated that independent 
audit committee members considered efficient (Abbott et al., 2000; Hussain & Mallin, 2003). The audit 
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members who are efficient assess the internal auditing plans to protect shareholder’s interests  (DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001). Accordingly, the independent audit committee members would ensure better financial 
management of companies, which also include the management of free cash flow. The results show that 
variable ACMEET has shown positive relationship with FCF and it is significant at one percent level. 
Therefore, H3 is also accepted meaning that the frequency of audit committee meetings effect on amount of 
FCF. It means that more audit committee meeting leads to more amount of free cash flow. Audit committee 
must prepare its members with sufficient time with the aim of performing their tasks of controlling their 
company’s financial reporting procedure. Consequently BRC (1999) recommended that audit committee 
members meet a minimum four times (quarterly) during a year and discuss about financial reporting quality 
and accounting issues and control related matters with outside members and directors. Frequent meeting can 
lead to better monitoring of firm’s financial reporting process and therefore making better decision on firm’s 
long-term planning. The regularity of the meeting should also depend on the nature of tasks and activities as 
to ensure that the audit committee achieves their goals and purposes.  Therefore, having more meetings can 
improve the internal governance procedures and also the firm’s free cash flow. Consequently, the amount of 
free cash flow can be directly related with audit committee meetings.  
  
The last variable, financial literacy of audit committee members (ACFIN) show a non-significant relationship 
with FCF. Although, it is in positive coefficient sign but, there is no significant relationship with these two 
variables. Therefore H4 cannot be accepted. The SEC (1999) requires that each audit committee consist of a 
minimum one member who is considered as financial experts. Our result is not consistent with DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) that state an audit committee which has financial expertise lead to discovering the objects 
which are related to audit committee communication with management. The other variables in the regression 
model are control variables, which are tested against FCF. The size (LOGTA) and profitability (ROE) are 
statistically significant with positive relationship whereas LEVERAGE and LOGDPS both are insignificant. 
Also, there are in opposite sign of coefficient, which means that they are in positive and negative relationship 
with FCF, respectively. As shown in the Table 3 LEVERAGE is in positive sign while LOGDPS is in negative sign 
with free cash flow in this study. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics with free cash flow. Audit 
committees members are to maintain integrity of their monitoring function. Data of this study was collected 
at a single point of time (cross-sectional) to measure the relationship between dependent variable and 
independent variables in 2005 - 2008. The results show that size of audit committee, frequency of audit 
committee meeting, proportion of audit committee independence is positively associated with level of free 
cash flow (FCF). When the size of the audit committee is big, it means there are more skills and knowledge 
sharing, which can be utilized to monitor the financial reporting and procedure. The positive relationship 
between frequency of meeting with free cash flow can be interpreted that having more meetings could lead to 
having more discussion and decision that contribute to keeping more free cash flow than spending it on the 
managers’ interests.  When audit committees are diligent in carrying out the audit duties they have would 
keep more free cash flow in a firm. The results also show a significant positive relationship between audit 
committee independent with free cash flow. An audit committee member who is independent is considered 
as efficient (Kannan Raghunandan et al., 2001) especially in solving conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Future studies could examine a larger sample of companies in Malaysia to strengthen the 
conclusions of our study. Also, this study focus the firms in Malaysia to collect and analyze the data, however, 
the effect corporate governance and internal governance may be different from a broader view by including 
wider geographical area for the future studies. The results of study highlight the importance of corporate 
governance mechanism, in the form of audit committee characteristics, in the management of cash flow.  
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